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Replacing the “View from Nowhere”:
A Pragmatist-Feminist Science Classroom
by
Sarah Marie Stitzlein
University of New Hampshire

Teachers and Problematic Philosophies of Science
Few people would contest the importance of science teachers having an understanding of
and appreciation for the history and philosophy of science. Teachers’ beliefs in these areas of
their profession influence their behavior when teaching science and when implementing
approaches to science outlined in curricular and pedagogical guides (King, 1991; Pajares, 1992).
In this way, the teachers’ philosophies of science effect their doing, or sociology, of science.
While they tend to retain certain buzzwords from their science methods courses that are linked to
philosophical positions, such as “student-centered” and “hands-on”, some teachers do not
maintain new epistemological orientations toward science introduced in philosophy of science
courses, if they enroll in these courses at all (Levitt, 2002; Lederman, 1992). In other cases,
teachers have consciously tried to enact new philosophies in their classrooms, but revert to their
old ways when confronted with difficult situations or when confronted with content new to them
(Wallace & Louden, 2000). In still other cases, teachers are unaware of the underlying
philosophy of science guiding their teaching and inadvertently adopt the positivistic stance that
dominates popular images of science and its history. For unclear reasons, progress in philosophy
of science has historically been slow to reach the classroom. Instead, classroom practice often
continues to adhere to outdated and problematically founded understandings of science—
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Those teachers who acknowledge holding a traditional view of science—a considerable
proportion of teachers—describe it as “objective, empirical, and involved with issues of the
control of nature” (Pomeroy, 1993, p. 269). Correlatively, they view science as a collection of
proven facts (Aguirre, Haggerty, and Linder, 1990) and understand their role in the science
classroom as distributors of these facts (Tilgner, 1990; Gallagher, 1991). This notion of science
renders them local authorities, as they are the only participants in the classroom who dispense the
timeless truths of science. Admittedly, science as a stream of factual truths independent of
human influence can be a practically preferred form of knowledge in schools, popular culture,
and elsewhere. It packages the truths of the world as easily transferable commodities: they travel
well in texts, transfer well into notes, and test easily.
In this paper I will delineate this popular, though often unacknowledged or
misappropriated, philosophy of science in terms of the “view from nowhere”. Like many before
me, I believe that thorough, accurate, and useful science education requires a refined
understanding of philosophy of science on the part of the science teacher (King, 1991; Gallagher,
1991; Ryan & Aikenhead, 1992). This article explains problems with the dominant philosophy
underpinning many classrooms and attempts to flesh out an improved one. In part, I analyze
teachers’ philosophies of science by studying their classroom practice. This sociological
perspective allows me to see how guiding theories do and do not play out in the doing of science
within the classroom.
Admittedly, the process of encouraging some teachers to critically examine their own
philosophies of science and introducing them to this new approach in an understandable and
sustainable way is far from easy. My purpose here, rather, is to lay a theoretical grounding for an
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improved philosophy and to offer a rough sketch of some of the ways in which it might take
shape in the classroom. Hopefully my argument will persuade teachers and teacher educators
who cling to the view from nowhere, consciously or not, to rethink their philosophical
framework. My intent is not to abandon these teachers upon saying their view is mistaken, but
rather to suggest and illustrate a more robust alternative. In particular, I offer pragmatistfeminism
as an area of scholarship which is sensitive to their local concerns, while intent on
fleshing out a useful philosophy of science driven by social justice and human need to live in and
know the world well.
The Rise of Aperspectival Objectivity
The “view from nowhere” expressed by Thomas Nagel in 1986 is indicative of a notion
of objectivity that has developed since the Baconian revolution of science in the 1700’s. It
continues to operate as the dominant framework for conceiving science in the science classroom,
despite having been discounted by most contemporary philosophers of science. The Baconian
revolution called for an impartial approach to discovering facts of an absolute reality, which
eventually grew into a concern with standardizing scientific inquiries through the use of the
scientific method in the 1800’s. More recently, objectivity has been conceived as aperspectival
and devoid of human biases (Daston, 1994; Solomon, 1998). This notion is most closely aligned
with the type of objectivity that we see operating in Nagel’s work. Through pedagogical,
curricular, and sociological analyses of classrooms, aspects of each historical conception of
objectivity, and especially that promoted by Nagel, become evident. I argue that the conception
of objectivity as the view from nowhere cannot and should not be maintained in the science
classroom any longer.
Nagel presents the view from nowhere as a method of understanding that is the ideal
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framework for approaching epistemological and scientific endeavors. This notion is primarily
concerned with reaching a perspective that is not tied to humanness, values, or the world as we
interpret it. Hence, it attempts to achieve a standpoint for explaining the world that is detached
from any particular perspective. Operating under a correspondence theory of truth, it aims to
mechanistically match descriptions of reality with supposed actual states of affairs, regardless of
whether these accounts make sense with lived experience. The view from nowhere strives to see
the world in all of its objective, absolute reality and, thus, to derive impartial truths. Nagel does
admit that, as humans who necessarily interpret the world through filters of experience and
preferences, we are never completely able to overcome some aspects of our subjectivity and
therefore can never totally achieve objectivity. Nonetheless, he maintains that we should strive
to achieve the most objective standpoint we can by continually repeating the process of
detaching ourselves from any particular perspective as we practice science.
Many teachers, some consciously and others inadvertently, have adopted similar beliefs
regarding science and objectivity, asserting that science is absolute, factual, and not subject to
creativity or values (King, 1991; Pomeroy, 1993; Dickinson, et al., 2000). A large portion
believe science education should be geared toward “discovery learning”—that being discovery
of the facts which compose objective reality (Abell & Smith, 1992; Gustafson, 1995; Skamp &
Mueller, 2001). They also believe good science is free from human biases and emotions. In
these ways, they uphold the view from nowhere as the best approach to objective science. A
large number of teachers have accepted this stance without critically examining the
epistemological and ontological assumptions it entails.
Many feminists would argue that those teachers are adopting a stance that is incompatible
with their lived experience. Striving to achieve this ideal objectivity entails a belief in
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disembodied, aperspectival knowledge that most feminists argue is simply not possible.
Traditional empiricists hold that the subjects of knowledge are supposed to be transhistorical,
homogeneous, unitary, and disembodied. Many feminists, however, believe that people (the
subjects of knowledge), the objects of knowledge, and knowledge itself are always socially and
historically located and are, therefore, tied to embodied existence and embodied ways of
knowing (Harding, 1993). Additionally, they recognize and appreciate differences amongst
perspectives.
If teachers consider the ways in which they have come to know the world, I believe they
will discover that knowledge largely stems from bodily experience and transaction of
information between people, rather than through a process of distancing their thought processes
from themselves in accord with an often narrowly defined method. They may also find that the
knowledge which they value most does not necessarily correspond to an absolute reality, but is
that which is most useful in their attempts to lead the best lives possible in the world as they
experience it. In this way knowledge and value are not fully distinguishable. If credence is
granted to this argument, objectivity as an aperspectival approach to discovering facts about an
absolute reality is overturned as nonsensical and not necessarily of use for living well in the
present or foreseeable future.
According to most feminists and some pragmatists, the acknowledgment of both subject
and object as historically and politically situated requires that the subjects and objects of
knowledge be placed on a more level playing field. When this is done, objectivity, as a form of
responding to the rights and well being of fellow subjects as well as the objects of scientific
inquiry, must be considered (Heldke & Kellert, 1995). Objectivity, then, is achieved to the
extent that responsibility in inquiry is fulfilled and expanded. It follows that scientists must be
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held accountable for the results of their projects and that scientists must acknowledge the
political nature of their work. Objectivity understood as such implies relationships between
people, objects, and inquiry projects as central to its conception (Sullivan, 2001).
This understanding differs greatly from the view of science operating in the curricular
and pedagogical practices of many teachers. Those teachers tend to emphasize technical
knowledge that describes sets of evidence or events in precise, mechanistic, and reductionistic
ways and ultimately attempts to exercise controlling power over the environment (Pomeroy,
1993). This type of knowledge typically follows from an observation of or experimentation
upon an object and, hence, there is no equal or reciprocal interaction between the inquiring
subject and the object of inquiry (Oliver, 1990). Further, as Matthew Weinstein (2001) points
out, the National Science Education Standards themselves focus almost entirely on the role and
perspective of the scientist in the classroom. Thus, they exclude the interests and perspectives of
the objects with which they work and the other people involved in their larger inquiry project (p.
231).
By adhering to these standards, teachers present science as an activity done for and by
scientists only. It can be implied from the stereotypical and disproportionate group of scientists
employed in our country, that this is a project for a select group of highly intelligent white men
in lab coats. Students as young as kindergarten and practicing teachers have been shown to
portray scientists along these stereotypes (Barman, 1997). The word ‘scientist’ itself is packed
with prestige and power, a self-concept differing greatly from, for example, a shy eighth grade
science student interested in how the local water table affects the cleanliness of tap water in her
neighborhood. This child may feel isolated from the community of inquirers. She may think her
project is insignificant compared to those of ‘real’ scientists—despite the fact that her work may
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improve the health of people, animals, and water life in her area.
Insights from Pragmatist-Feminism
Philosopher Richard Bernstein (1991) describes the ethos of pragmatism as revolving
around “the themes of anti-foundationalism, fallibilism, the social character of the self and the
regulative ideal of a critical community, contingency, and pluralism” (p. 338). This social spirit
concerns concrete issues in the world, including oppression, and theorizes them from plural
locations while also experimenting with them in specific contexts. It is a framework compatible
with the larger aura of science insofar as it inductively forms theory from experience and tests
theory in experience in attempt to solve problems in the world. With a substantial history in
educational theory, pragmatism links education and science as essential to good living. Within
education, pragmatists focus on the habits of good living which students develop; these include
habitual attitudes toward and responses to science.
While hard to define feminism as a whole, many elements of feminist thinking
compliment and extend the pragmatic approach. Feminists also share concerns with practical
problems, particularly those of oppression, existing in the world. They encourage social
exploration and theoretical explanation of these problems from a variety of positioned
perspectives. Of particular note, feminists argue for pluralism by drawing attention to the unique
perspectives of women as well as the mediated experiences of people inhabiting all perspectives.
Extending pragmatic concerns with the contexts of problems and theorizing, “Feminism cogently
and extensively shows how gender, race, class, and sexual preference are crucial parts of context
that philosophy has traditionally neglected” (Seigfried, 1996, p. 39). The pragmatic ethos guides
feminist questions about inequity, social responsibility, and promoting satisfactory living for all
people in all situations.
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While both traditions overlap in these ways, pragmatist-feminists consciously combine
the two so as to magnify and apply the pragmatic outlook to feminist concerns and vice versa.
When combined, pragmatism and feminism work together to provide a robust philosophy for
interpreting the world, including the world of science and the value of objectivity it upholds. It
forms a unique, socially responsible framework for understanding science as well as an intricate
connection to education as a simultaneous site of real-world problem solving. Importantly,
pragmatist-feminism promotes working hypotheses rather than adherence to strict rules, for the
former allows for growth and change when the philosophical approach proves to no longer be
satisfactory (Sullivan, 2002, p. 230).
Delineating the pragmatic notion of truth central to pragmatist-feminism will be helpful
for understanding its appropriateness as a replacement framework for the science classroom.
Moreover, this criterion for truth and the more robust sense of objectivity I will later describe
show how this scientific framework differs from more general social constructionist approaches.
Unlike the “view from nowhere” system which holds a correspondence theory of truth,
pragmatists believe ideas become true insofar as they ‘work’ for us, profitably combine our
experiences, and lead us to further experiences that satisfy our needs. Pragmatists, like William
James and John Dewey, are concerned with the concrete differences in our lived experiences that
an idea’s being true will make. Unlike the correspondence theory of truth that underlies
empiricism, “pragmatic truth is not the agreement of proposition with reality, but an expression
of the anticipated or actual successful completing of a worthwhile leading” (Haddock Seigfried,
1990, p. 294).
Truth is something which occurs when the goals of human flourishing are satisfied, at
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least temporarily. Pragmatic objectivity, then, comes to concern embodied and dynamic
relationships between people and the world in which they live and cannot be strictly confined to
absolute and unchanging truths. This is an enticing framework which compliments lived
experience and is aligned with social justice goals—values of good living which cannot be
completely distinguished from factual knowledge of the world. It is my hope that science
teachers concerned with improving the world as well as their students’ knowledge of it, will find
it compelling.
Thus far, it has become evident that pragmatist-feminists call the role of perspective into
play. They disavow the possibility of a transcended view from nowhere, existing as disembodied
and transhistorical. Interestingly, the feminists’ focus on perspective was nearly historically
paralleled by developments in science itself, such as relativity theory and the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, which also called the existence of an observer-independent standpoint into
question (Crowder & Warburton, 1995; Roth, 2000). Some feminists with pragmatic concerns,
like Lisa Heldke and Stephen Kellert, hung on to the conception of objectivity as independent of
a particular perspective, but instead suggested that objectivity is best achieved by actually
including a maximum number of concrete perspectives (1995, p. 372). Pragmatist-feminists like
these fashion objectivity through interdependencies among multiple and diverse perspectives,
while maintaining rigor and critical capacities.
Concerns with the inclusion of multiple perspectives can be traced to Sandra Harding’s
early work on feminist standpoint epistemology (1986, 1993, 1994) that supports a different
notion of objectivity. With roots in the Hegelian master/slave relationship, feminist standpoint
theorists argue that women, as oppressed people, are able to notice the oppressor’s failure to
fully achieve his or her proclaimed objectivity. Often, these women are able to point out the
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andocentric and sexist underpinnings that affect the results of scientific studies. Science, then,
would benefit by beginning from the lives of women in that they could contribute the pluralistic
and diverse viewpoints needed to unmask the harmful prejudices acting in some scientific
endeavors. Interestingly, some students already hold similar views as indicated by a 1992 survey
of high school students in which 11% agreed with the statement, “women would make somewhat
different discoveries because, by nature or by upbringing, females have different values,
viewpoints, perspectives, or characteristics such as sensitivity toward consequences” (Ryan &
Aikenhead, p. 569). While not entirely expressing Harding’s view that the oppressed have a
more objective stance than the oppressor, these students do show an inkling that women, as a
uniquely positioned group, may have key insights and traits to lend science by virtue of their
position.
Feminist standpoint epistemologists argue that women’s experiences provide the
foundation from which important scientific questions rise and that women can be a starting point
for achieving maximal objectivity. Although Harding acknowledges the situatedness and
valueladenness of the human perspective, she still maintains a conception of objectivity in her
early work that is more closely aligned with that of traditional empiricism. She believes that a
more clear, representationalist, vision of the world can be uncovered by starting from the lives of
women. Nonetheless, science can profit by starting from the lives of the oppressed and this
aspect of the feminist standpoint theorists’ understanding of objectivity, one in accord with
pragmatic situated pluralism, will be useful for constructing a new, pragmatist-feminist notion.
Many science teachers uphold the scientific method as a procedure for maximizing
objectivity through overcoming human values, emotions, and opinions (Harding 1993; Gardner,
1998). They tend to see the world of science as hierarchical and competitive, where the most
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objective and value free scientists and theories prevail through adherence to said method. By
way of teachers, media, and other cultural influences, this belief has trickled down into the
viewpoints of students. Resultingly, the majority of students shun the role of contextual values
and support the statement that “the best scientists are always very open-minded, logical,
unbiased, and objective in their work” (Ryan & Aikenhead, 1992, p 568).
Some feminists, however, embrace those unwanted values that science teachers see as
subversive to methodological knowledge and not capable of being consistently tested by
empirical experiments. Alison Jaggar (1998), for instance, holds that emotions are essential
elements of knowledge construction, play an intentional aspect in judgment making, and
influence the way we observe the world. Due to their intricate and inseparable link to human
life, emotions cannot be removed through an appeal to a standardizing method. On the contrary,
emotions can be constructively used while practicing science. For instance, joy at a discovery
may lead an inquiry in a new direction or fear may indicate a problem with the study at hand.
Teachers should encourage students to recognize and respond to these emotions.
Douglas Allchin (1991) argues that many of our cultural and ethical values may actually
bolster those of science. He asserts that “some values in science govern how we regulate the
potentially biasing effect of other values in producing reliable knowledge. Indeed, a diversity of
values promotes more robust knowledge where they intersect” (p. 1). A chief example of such a
regulatory value would be a commitment to democratic interaction. Enacting democratic
dialogue and consensus (albeit temporary) in the classroom, can potentially provide policing of
harmful biases operating in some inquiry projects. Granted, however, democracy is also capable
of maintaining those biases as well. When democratic attention is explicitly directed toward
oppressed, multiple, and diverse perspectives, though, the chances of this problematic
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maintenance occurring are minimized. Finally this attention shapes the resulting knowledge in
ways that make it more trustworthy than simply socially constructed science.
On another note, pragmatist-feminists are concerned with the political nature of science
and its ability to bring about social change. John Dewey, a key pragmatist educational
philosopher, strongly supported a contextually immersed notion of the scientific method as a way
to verify ideas as pragmatically true and ultimately bring about changes needed to adapt to and
improve the human condition. Within the practice of science, Dewey argued that scientists must
be honest with their data and must take social factors into consideration, thereby achieving a new
type of socially conscious objectivity that serves a functional purpose. Unlike many science
teachers, however, Dewey and James strongly contended that truth is not reached at the
conclusion of one practice or a certain number of repetitions of a precisely patterned scientific
method. Instead, the inquiry process must be carried on continually, with constant revision and
expansion in order to get at a fuller view of lived experience, rather than just partial abstractions
or collections of facts relevant to technical subject matter. Pragmatists call for praxis between
these partial bits that can practically help us meet our immediate needs through action and the
larger theoretical goals of answering enduring (and perhaps unanswerable) questions about life
through reflection (Rescher, 2000, p. 110). The truths that arise out of this process, then, are
temporary, falsifiable, and more aligned with goals of improving life.
Implementing a Redefined Objectivity
Through this discussion of pragmatist-feminist objections to objectivity conceived as the
view from nowhere, a new form of objectivity is being shaped. This reformed conception is a
responsible and socially conscious objectivity that is achieved at the intersection of willfully
included multiple and diverse perspectives. It is a standpoint employed not in regard to an
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absolute reality disconnected from human experience, but rather in regard to our everyday, lived
experience. It is not relativistic in that it allows for and requires judgments to be made about the
status of life, the trustworthiness of inquiry, and the effects of each scientific endeavor. Because
of their potential hindrance to improving human life, it calls for a ridding of values that are
racist, sexist, classist, ageist, gender biased, or based on sexual preference. Thus, it identifies
and casts out values that do not promote a satisfactory leading, while cherishing those that do.
Furthermore, this form of objectivity requires the conscious inclusion of oppressed perspectives
and capitalizes on the insights they may have to offer. It is not a detached objectivity, but rather
an objectivity that genuinely arises out of and accurately considers our shared, though varied,
existence. As such, it has a practical and functional value.
I believe that this pragmatist-feminist objectivity should replace the view from nowhere
currently employed in many science classrooms. Science, as a content area, should become
concerned with facts and theories that are pertinent to our continued and improved existence as
humans rather than a collection of fixed facts seemingly distant from the lives of students
learning them. The pragmatic truth of these concepts and explanations should be verified
through scientific experiment met with similar demands from our environment. Hypotheses and
theories that are not verified as immediately capable of leading to further satisfying experiences
should be stored for potential future use, but not be labeled true at present. As inquiry, science in
the classroom should be concerned with problems and issues facing humans, culture, and society,
especially those of immediate and local importance. This differs from the more positivistic
objectivity which assigns scientific importance without thorough or, in some cases, even initial
consideration of the role of humans and their needs. It is in this regard that the feminist, social
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justice orientation of such inquiry is most clear. As feminist, it is centrally concerned with the
local problems and the well being of all people, especially minorities or those historically
oppressed. These guiding concerns extend the pragmatist-feminist framework beyond social
constructionism.
The new objectivity should also be both physically and mentally engaging, suggestive of
the pertinence and importance of participating in such inquiry. It should welcome critique and
challenging questions regarding its ethical and appropriate use. As an attitude, science should be
taught as a complex, critical, intricate, and valuable, socially concerned stance. Teachers should
approach objectivity from a human perspective, rather than one that is disembodied and striving
toward an impossible knowledge of a detached, absolute world. I will conclude by suggesting
several curricular and pedagogical approaches to science that I think are well aligned with this
pragmatist-feminist understanding of objectivity and science as a whole.
Wolff-Michael Roth and Angela Calabrese Barton have each suggested the use of
autobiography in the science classroom (2000; 2000). While not explicitly pragmatist-feminists,
their ideas are in accord with the pragmatist-feminist orientation. Roth argues that
“autobiography and other first-person methods enacted together with critical doubt are important
aspects in making rigorous any disciplinary method” (2000, p. 2). This increased rigor is
evidenced in the intersubjectivity that is arrived at by having all participants in a class put their
autobiographies out on the table and then striving to interpret each one with respect to the
scientific inquiries of the class. Roth believes it is necessary to know the autobiography of the
scientist, as the observer, because her background influences her observations.
As each person constructs her autobiography, she is able to make herself aware of her
prejudices, pull them into doubt, and change or eliminate them if needed. Roth insists that an
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essential aspect of the autobiographical genre is that it is written for “the other” to hear and that
the other is given the agency of assigning meaning to it. Insofar as people lack ownership of
language as a whole, “autobiography as written text is therefore also associated with alienation,
for we always have to use the words which are not entirely our own, but always also belong to
the Other” (2000, p. 7). In our context, classmates, as others, are assigned the task of translating
and rearticulating each student’s life story in such a way that critically examines the attitudes,
beliefs, and experiences that each student brings to the classroom. Of course, students in more
powerful positions may construct the other as subordinate. Teachers need to be aware of and
combat this tendency, perhaps by encouraging an ethic of care within this potentially harmful
situation (Haddock Seigfried, 1996, p. 268).
A more overtly pragmatic use of autobiography would be to employ it as a tool for
bringing the habits which constitute one’s self into consciousness so that they can be improved.
These may be habits of prejudice or habits of distrust of science. Through autobiography, then,
we shape a new identity for ourselves and for others. When autobiography is constructed in light
of specific scientific inquiry, we redefine and reposition ourselves as both the subjects and
objects of science. As embodied beings who cannot achieve observer-independent objectivity,
we can critically bring together knowledge of our autobiographies and varied perspectives to
form an inter-subjectivity that avoids relativism and allows for scientific progress. Furthermore,
a sense of solidarity among the students may be revealed as they discover similarities in their
experiences with science through the sharing of their stories.
Angela Calabrese Barton adds that science education reform often calls for a focus on
“everyday life” (2000, p. 38), but suggests that, through an understanding of the importance of
autobiography, the focus should really be on lived experience. She notes that examples from
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“real life” typically used in the science classroom are often geared toward specific experiences of
privileged males—experiences that fit neatly with the concept being explained. For instance, I
recall my high school physics teacher explaining velocity derivatives by referring to the flight of
a model rocket. I had never in my life seen a model rocket and the example had little use for me,
no matter how accurately the rocket displayed the concept at hand. Autobiographies, however,
show that lived experience is much more complex, hence, challenging “neat science” (2000, p.
38). Autobiography, then, can provide the medium for connecting science to such complicated
lived experience, thereby making science useful in terms of explanation and improving
environmental conditions. Many teachers claim that science should be similarly student-centered
(Levitt, 2002), yet they uphold epistemological assumptions in their teaching which promote
learning that is achieved by students abstracting themselves from their social and historical
positions and is, therefore, “student-less,” regardless of the rhetoric that masks it.
Much of Calabrese Barton’s work rests on her understanding of scientific knowledge as
local and reflexive. Localness is tied to pragmatist-feminism in that local knowledge is
concerned with the immediate social uses of science and its products. Michael Bryne and Alex
Johnstone (1987) call for a similar concern with the social uses and effects of science in the
classroom. They suggest science classes that consider practical problems that may relate to other
academic subjects, such as social studies, and reflexively deal with pressing issues in that
community, like the use of birth control. “Consequently we need to provide opportunities for
students to think about science in the context of wider social, economic, and applied problems,
and in so doing help them to learn to apply critical standards both in science and in
sciencerelated
contexts” (p. 333). Similarly, Donald Oliver suggests what he calls “grounded knowing”
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in the science classroom. This type of knowing is opposed to technical knowing in that it is a
deeper, holistic, and more connected way of defining our complex relationships with our culture
and the natural world.
All of these social concerns with science coalesce with William Cobern’s (1996)
promotion of the public understanding of science as based in the public’s legitimate interests in
science, rather than in the interests of science (p. 12). That is, the public’s ability to use science
for social purposes, rather than merely as a false way of objectively arriving at a (non-existent)
absolute reality. I would add that an excellent way to constructively reveal the ever-changing
purposes and effects of scientific inquiry is through student role-playing. By assuming and
imagining the role of a beauty product test rabbit, a starving family receiving Golden Rice, or an
infertile couple undergoing in vitro fertilization, students are able to discover the local and
humanistic aspects of science as well as envision new uses for science on a global scale.
Importantly, these roles would be reflexively undertaken with regard to previously shared
autobiographies, thus challenging and reconfiguring student identities as inquirers.
Douglas Allchin (1999) suggests that “science teachers who understand the multi-faceted
relationship between science and values can guide students more effectively in fully appreciating
the nature of science through reflexive exercises and case studies” (p. 1). Allchin sees the
classroom as an ideal place where the values and perspectives of many people can be brought
together, rather than transcended, in a scientific pursuit to form a more robust type of objectivity.
This bringing together of perspectives, then, requires an open discussion on the part of the
teacher concerning the shaping role of the values the students bring with them. These values can
be put to use in objectivity building by pulling them into the critical consciousness of the entire
class. In a constructivist setting, students can be first asked to reflexively consider those values
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that they hold and those values supported by the scientific process. Outside and overarching
values can also be brought into play by the employment of historical case studies in the
classroom. Being able to reflect on the currently evident consequences of past values in
scientific inquiry in those case studies will allow for their effects to be clearer for students. Then
the students and teacher can decide as a community how those values should be objectively dealt
with as they carry out their scientific inquiry in the present.
Finally, Maralee Mayberry (2001) suggests a feminist pedagogy, rather than a
collaborative learning pedagogy, to be used in the science classroom. She charges collaborative
learning with being “a social reproductive pedagogy that encourages students to gain proficiency
in the dominant discourse of existing science systems, whereas feminist pedagogy is a socially
transformative pedagogy that invites students to critically analyze existing science systems and
their relationship to social oppression and domination” (pp. 145-146). She claims that
collaborative learning involves a disembodiment from the doer of science in that each student
becomes abstracted from their socially historical position in order to conform to the discourse
practices of the dominant group. Here, this would involve both a forced perception and practice
of an idealized objectivity as a view from nowhere. In feminist pedagogy, one’s embodiedness
is valued as a part of one’s identity that can be brought forward democratically in a dialogical
process of scientific inquiry. It should be noted, though, that feminist pedagogy is collaborative
in the sense that it brings together a diverse and embodied group of learners, typically with at
least one common concern. This critical pedagogy meshes well with the socially conscious,
responsible, and embodied pragmatist-feminist conception of objectivity and science for which I
am arguing.
In closing, I believe that I have fashioned more robust, practical, and democratically
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rigorous conceptions of science and objectivity through consideration of pragmatist-feminism.
Studies have shown that to encourage the participation of all students, especially girls and people
of color, “science teaching needs to be more concrete, to make connections to lived experience
of the student, to engage students in social collaboration, and to consider topics of contemporary
interest (Sanders, Koch & Urso, 1997; Kahle, 1994; Sadker & Sadker, 1994)” (Koch, 2002, p.
21). The philosophy of science and its corresponding pedagogies described here do just that.
Objectivity, as I have described it, is applicable to the socially and historically constructed world
in which we live and its study. Finally, this refashioned objectivity can and should be put to
work in science classrooms, replacing masculinist, homogenizing, nonsensical, and potentially
harmful objectivity as the “view from nowhere”.

Electronic Journal of Science Education, Vol. 9, No. 2, December, 2004

References
Abell, S. K., & Smith, D. C. (1992). What is science? Preservice elementary teachers’
conceptions of the nature of science. In A. Hills (Ed.), The history and philosophy of
science in science education, vol. 1 (pp. 11-22). Queen’s University, ONT, Math,
Science, Technology, and Teacher Education Group.
Aguirre, J. M., Haggerty, S. M., & Linder, C. J. (1990). Student-teachers’ conceptions of
science, teaching, and learning: A case study in preservice science education.
International Journal of Science Education, 12(4), 381-390.
Allchin, D. (1999). Values in science: An educational perspective. Science and Education, 8, 112.
Barman, C. (1997). Students’ views of scientists and science: Results from a national study.
Science and Children, 35(1), 18-24.
Bernstein, R. J. (1992). The new constellation. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Byrne, M. & Johnstone, A. (1987). Critical thinking in science education. Studies in Higher
Education, 12, 325-339.
Calabrese Barton, A. (2000) Autobiography in science education: Greater objectivity through
local knowledge. Research in Science Education, 30, 23-42.
Cobern, W. (1996) Public understanding of science as seen by the scientific community: do we
need to re-conceptualize the challenge and to re-examine our own assumptions? Paper
presented at the Seminar for Science, Technology, and Citizenship. Norway, Sweeden.
Crowder, E. & Warburton, E. (1995) Perspective-taking in classroom science talk. Paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association. San
Francisco, California.
Electronic Journal of Science Education, Vol. 9, No. 2, December, 2004

Daston, L. (1994) Baconian facts, academic civility, and the prehistory of objectivity. In A.
Megill (Ed.), Rethinking objectivity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Akerson, V., Abd-El-Khalick, F., & Lederman, N. (2000). Changing elementary teachers’
views of the nature of science: effective strategies for scientific methods courses. ERIC
Document Reproduction Service No. ED441680
Gallagher, J.J. (1991). Perspective and practicing secondary school science teachers’ knowledge
and beliefs about the philosophy of science. Science Education, 75(1), 121-134.
Gardner, P. (1998). Teaching at it’s best: a passionate detachment in the classroom. PS:
Political Science and Politics, 31, 802-804.
Gustafson, B.J. (1995). Elementary preservice teachers: constructing conceptions about learning
science, teaching science, and the nature of science. International Journal of Science
Education, 17(5), 589-605.
Harding, S. (1986). The science question in feminism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Harding, S. (1993). Rethinking standpoint epistemology: What is “strong objectivity”?
In L. Alcoff & E. Potter (Eds.), Feminist epistemologies. New York: Routledge.
Harding, S. (1994). Starting through and from women’s lives: Eight resources for maximizing
objectivity. In P. Goldstein (Ed.), Styles of cultural activism: From theory and pedagogy
to women, Indians, and communism. Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press.
Heldke, L. & Kellert, S. (1995). Objectivity as responsibility. Metaphilosophy, 26, 360-377.
Jaggar, A. (1998). Love and knowledge: emotion in feminist epistemology. In S. Kemp & J.
Squires (Eds.), Feminisms. New York: Oxford University Press.
James, W. (1975). Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Electronic Journal of Science Education, Vol. 9, No. 2, December, 2004

Kahle, J. B. (1994). Research on girls and science: Lessons and applications. In D. Gabel (Ed.),
Handbook of research in science teaching and learning. Washington D.C.: National
Science Teachers Assocation.
King, B. B. (1991). Beginning teachers’ knowledge of an attitudes toward history and
philosophy of science. Science Education, 75(1), 135-141.
Lederman, N. G. (1992). Students’ and teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science: A review
of research. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 29(4), 331-359.
Levitt, K. E. (2002). An analysis of elementary teachers’ beliefs regarding the teaching and
learning of science. Science Education, 86(1), 1-22.
Mayberry, M., Subramaniam, B., & Weasel, L. (Eds.) (2001). Feminist science studies. New
York: Routledge.
Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
National Research Council. (1996). National science education standards. Washington, D.C.,
National Academy Press.
Oliver, D. (1990). Grounded knowing: a postmodern perspective on teaching and learning.
Educational Leadership, 48, 64-69.
Pajares, M. F. (1992). Teachers’ beliefs and educational research: Cleaning up a messy
construct. Review of Educational Research, 62(3), 307-322.
Pomeroy, D. (1993). Implications of teachers’ beliefs about the nature of science: comparison of
the beliefs of scientists, secondary science teachers, and elementary teachers. Science
Education, 77(3), 261-278.
Rescher, N. (2000). Realistic pragmatism: An introduction to pragmatic philosophy. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
Electronic Journal of Science Education, Vol. 9, No. 2, December, 2004

Roth, W. M. (2000). Autobiography and science education: an introduction. Research in
Science Education, 30, 1-12.
Ryan, A. G., & Aikenhead, G. S. (1992). Students’ preconceptions about the epistemology of
science. Science Education, 76(6), 559-580.
Sadker, M., & Sadker, D. (1994). Failing at fairness: How America’s schools cheat girls. New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Sanders, J., Koch, J., & Urso, J. (1997). Gender equity right from the start: Instructional
activities for teacher educators in mathematics, science, and technology. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Seigfried, C. H. (1990). William James’s radical reconstruction of philosophy. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press.
Seigfried, C. H. (1996). Pragmatism and feminism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Skamp, K., & Mueller, A. (2001). Student teachers’ conceptions about effective primary science
teaching: a longitudinal study. International Journal of Science Education, 23(4), 331351.
Solomon, J. (1998). Objectivity in the making: Francis Bacon and the politics of inquiry.
Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
Sullivan, S. (2001). Living across and through skins. Bloomington, IN: University Press.
Sullivan, S. (2002). The need for truth: Toward a pragmatist-feminist standpoint theory. In C.
H. Seigfried (Ed.), Feminist interpretations of John Dewey. University Park, PA: Penn
State Press.

Electronic Journal of Science Education, Vol. 9, No. 2, December, 2004

Tilgner, P. (1990). Avoiding science in the elementary school. Science Education, 74(4), 421431.
Wallace, J & Louden, W. (2000). Teachers’ learning: Stories of science education. Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Weinsten, M. (2001). Guinea pig pedagogy. In A. Calabrese Barton & M. Osborne (Eds.),
Teaching science in diverse settings. New York: Peter Lang.

About the author…
Sarah Marie Stitzlein, formerly of the University of Illinois Educational Policy
Studies and Gender and Women's Studies departments, is currently an Assistant Professor in the
Education Department at the University of New Hampshire. As a philosopher of education, her
research brings together American pragmatism with post-structural feminism to investigate
issues of social justice, identity, and political agency.

Electronic Journal of Science Education, Vol. 9, No. 2, December, 2004

